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Abstract: The issue of economic governance is highly discussed pertaining to the 
question of industrialisation of a country, yet the literature on international trade and 
foreign direct investment (FDI) hardly pays attention to this aspect. We show that 
higher investment in economic governance attracts FDI. However, whether the 
possibility of FDI induces more investment in governance is not immediate, and 
depends on the factors such as the marginal cost difference between the firms, the 
international transportation cost and the cost of FDI. Our results suggest that we may 
expect a two-way relationship between investment in economic governance and 
inward FDI in more technologically backward domestic countries. However, a less 
technologically backward domestic country may have a strategic reason for relatively 
poor economic governance in order to prevent FDI, if we control for other benefits 
from FDI, such as knowledge spillover and domestic employment generation. 
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1 for improving the investment climate is an important 
objective of many developing countries, and is getting significant attention in both 
academic and policy circles. As mentioned in the World Development Report (2005), 
“A good investment climate provides opportunities and incentives for firms – from 
micro-enterprises to multinationals – to invest productively, create jobs, and expand.” 
There are several factors, such as policy uncertainty, macro instability, corruption, 
cost and access to finance, crime, regulation and tax administration, courts and legal 
system, electricity, labour regulations, transportation, access to land and 
telecommunications, affecting investment climates (World Development Report, 
2005), and many (if not all) of which can be improved through better economic 
governance.  
The implications of economic governance are getting more attention in the 
economics literature (see, Kaufmann and Kraay, 2003, Dixit, 2007 and Rodrik, 2008), 
yet the literature on international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) did not pay 
much attention to this aspect. Due to the favourable effects of governance on  the 
                                                 
1 According to the World Bank, there are six indicators of governance - voice and accountability, 
political stability and the absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law 
and control of corruption. The World Bank report (2010) on Doing Business considers 10 indicators – 
starting a business, dealing with construction permits, employing workers, registering property, getting 
credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and closing a 
business. The interpretation of governance by the UK’s Department for International Development 
(DFID) broadens and suggests that: “Good governance requires three things: State capability – the 
extent to which leaders and governments are able to get things done. Responsiveness – whether public 
policies and institutions respond to the needs of citizens and uphold their rights. Accountability – the 
ability of citizens, civil society and the private sector to scrutinise public institutions and governments 
and hold them to account” (DFID, 2006).   2 
 
investment climate and the significant flows of FDIs in recent years
2, it is natural to 
examine the relationship between governance and FDI, which we do in this paper. 
There are some empirical papers which show that economic governance and 
FDI are positively correlated (Sin and Leung, 2001, Globerman and Shapiro, 2002, 
Gani, 2007 and Fan et al., 2007). However, correlation does not imply causality. 
Moreover, opposite views also prevail in the literature. Chang (2007) points out that 
the performances of some countries with weak governance are better than their 
counterparts with strong governance. Weller and Ulmer (2008) mention that “… 
China has attracted significant foreign investment despite notoriously persistent 
corruption”. Hence, the effects of economic governance on international trade, 
investment and welfare may not be trivial, and it is due to the fact that real-world 
economies operate in a second-best environment because of multiple distortions of 
reform policies (Rodrik, 2008). 
We develop a simple model to show how the causality between governance 
and FDI runs. Using a simple model with a technologically superior foreign 
(developed-country) firm and a technologically inferior domestic (developing-country) 
firm, we show that if the marginal cost difference between the firms is large compared 
to international transportation cost, there is a two-way relationship between 
investment in economic governance and FDI, if the cost of FDI is moderate; 
otherwise, even if higher investment in governance attracts FDI, the amount of 
investment in governance does not depend on the possibility of FDI.  
However, if the marginal cost difference between the firms is small compared 
to international transportation cost, we find that, although higher investment in 
governance attracts FDI, the possibility of FDI (compared to no possibility of FDI) 
reduces investment in governance, if the cost of FDI is small; otherwise, even if 
                                                 
2 As mentioned in UNCTAD (2006), FDI dominates international trade in recent years. 3 
 
higher investment in governance attracts FDI, the amount of investment in 
governance does not depend on the possibility of FDI. 
Our results suggest that we may expect a two-way relationship between 
investment in economic governance and inward FDI in more technologically 
backward domestic countries. However, a less technologically backward domestic 
country may have a strategic reason for relatively poor economic governance in order 
to prevent FDI, if we control for other benefits from FDI, such as knowledge spillover 
and domestic employment generation.  Thus, our analysis provides explanations for 
the mixed empirical evidences on economic governance and FDI. 
In an interesting paper, Banerjee (1997) argues why government bureaucracies 
are often associated with red tape, corruption, and lack of incentives. He shows that 
the presence of asymmetric information may create the rationale for mis-governance 
by a benevolent government. We point out a different reason for poor economic 
governance. The presence of foreign competition may create a strategic reason for 
underinvestment in economic governance, which may justify the findings in Chang 
(2007) and Weller and Ulmer (2008).  
  The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 shows the model 
and derives the results. Section 3 concludes. 
 
2. The model and the results 
Assume that there are two countries, called domestic country and foreign country. 
There is a firm in each country. Assume that firm 1 is in the domestic country and 
firm 2 is in the foreign country. These firms compete in the domestic country like 
Cournot duopolists with homogeneous goods. However, firm 2 can serve the domestic 
country either by export or by FDI. 4 
 
Assume that the firms’ marginal costs consist of the costs of production, 
marketing and distribution. We assume that the marginal cost of firm 1 is  1 c . Firm 2’s 
marginal cost is  21 cc < , under both export and FDI. The higher marginal cost of firm 
1 to that of firm 2 may represent the technical superiority of firm 2 compared to firm 1. 
However, if firm 2 exports to the domestic country, it incurs an additional per-unit 
transportation cost, t. On the other hand, if firm 2 undertakes FDI, it needs to set up its 
production plant in the domestic country, and therefore, needs to incur a fixed 
investment cost  F. 
As already mentioned, better economic governance improves several aspects 
of the economy and creates a better investment climate, which, in turn, increases 
efficiency and profitability of the firms. For our modelling purpose, we assume that 
better economic governance in the domestic country helps to reduce the marginal cost 
by improving productivity of the firms. We assume that the above-mentioned 
marginal costs are under minimal (or no) economic governance in the domestic 
country. However, g amount of investment by the domestic government to improve 
economic governance reduce firm 1’s marginal cost to  1 () cg −  and firm 2’s marginal 
cost to  2 () cg −   by reducing corruption and red-tapism, improving infrastructural 
facilities, transportation, legal system and labour regulations, to name a few. We 







    Few remarks deserve attention at this point. First, for simplicity, we have 
assumed that economic governance affects the marginal costs of firm 2 under export 
and under FDI in the same way. This is appropriate for situations where economic 
governance in the domestic country improves infrastructure and transportation 5 
 
facilities, thus reducing the marginal costs related to the non-production activities 
such as marketing and distribution, which often play important role in affecting a 
firm’s decision on foreign market entry (Nocke and Yeaple, 2007, Qiu, 2009 and 
Ishikawa, et al. 2010). We acknowledge that a more general model will consider that 
economic governance in the domestic country will reduce firm 2’s marginal costs 
under export and under FDI differently. However, we assume away this possibility, 
since it will only complicate our analysis without adding much new insights to our 
purpose. It is trivial to understand that if the foreign firm’s benefit from better 
economic governance in the domestic country is higher under FDI compared to export, 
it increases the foreign firm’s incentive for FDI compared to our analysis. 
Second, there may be other benefits of economic governance, say, reducing 
firm 2’s cost of undertaking FDI. However, our assumption of the marginal cost 
reducing effect of economic governance helps us to consider similar effects of 
governance on both firms. It is trivial that if governance in the domestic country also 
reduces firm 2’s cost of undertaking FDI, it will create further incentive for FDI 
compared to the one shown in our analysis. 
Finally, our consideration of international transportation cost can be motivated 
by empirical evidences. Milner (2005) shows that even if the tariff barriers have been 
reduced in recent years, transportation costs are still significant and create sufficiently 
large trading costs. Similar conclusion can be found in Hummels (1991), according to 
whom transportation cost often represents a greater barrier to international trade than 
tariffs. Costs relating to transportation costs (excluding tariff costs), estimated by the 
World Bank (2010), are varying across countries and account for a relatively higher 
value even in OECD countries compared to some Latin American and East Asia 6 
 
countries.
5 The inclusion of tariff barrier will not affect our qualitative results on firm 
2’s decision on FDI and export, but the presence of tariff revenue will create higher 
domestic welfare under export by the foreign firm than shown in our analysis. 
  We assume that the inverse demand function in the domestic country is: 
  1 Pq =−,                 ( 1 )  
where P is price and q is the total output. 
  We consider the following game. At stage 1, the domestic government invests 
in economic governance, i.e., determines g. At stage 2, firm 2 decides whether to 
undertake FDI or to export. At stage 3, the firms compete like Cournot duopolists, and 
the profits are realised. We solve the game through backward induction. 
  First, consider the game under export by firm 2 for a given investment by the 
domestic government. In this situation, firms 1 and 2 maximise the following 
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5 Doing Business Survey by World Bank (2010) defines the transportation cost and measures the time 
and cost (excluding tariffs) associated with exporting and importing by ocean transport, and the number 
of documents necessary to complete the transaction. The indicators cover procedural requirements such 
as documentation requirements and procedures at customs and other regulatory agencies as well as at 
the port. They also cover trade logistics, including the time and cost of inland transport to the largest 
business city. These are key dimensions of the ease of trading—the more time consuming and costly it 
is to export or import, the more difficult it is for traders to be competitive and to reach international 
markets. 7 
 
  Now consider the game under FDI by firm 2 for a given investment by the 
domestic government. In this situation, firms 1 and 2 maximise the following 








q Max q c g q F −− + − .         ( 4 b )  




































= .                (5) 
Now consider firm 2’s incentive for export and FDI for a given investment by 
the domestic government. The comparison of the profits of firm 2 under export and 
under FDI (see (3) and (5)) shows that firm 2 undertakes FDI if 
21 94 ( 1 2 )
4




>≡ .            ( 6 )  
It follows from (6) that as F increases, we need a higher value of g to make FDI 
profitable compared to export by firm 2.  
The following result follows immediately from (6).  
 
Proposition 1: Ceteris paribus, higher investment by the domestic government in 
governance (i.e., gg > ) induces the foreign firm to undertake FDI. 
 
  The reason for the above result is as follows. Better governance reduces the 
marginal costs of both firms by the same amount, thus increasing firm 2’s profit under 8 
 
both FDI and export. However, since the transportation cost creates a distortion in 
firm 2’s profit under export, firm 2’s gain from better governance is higher under FDI 
than under export. Hence, better governance increases firm 2’s incentive for FDI. 
Now we determine the domestic government’s investment in economic 
governance. The domestic government invests in governance to maximise domestic 
welfare, which is the sum of consumer surplus and the domestic profit.  
If the domestic government anticipates that firm 2 will export, the domestic 
welfare is 
22 2
12 12 2(1 2 ) (2 2 )
18 2
x cctg cct g hg
w
−+ + ++ − − − +
=− .      (7) 
Hence, the domestic government will maximise the following expression to determine 
investment in governance, if it anticipates export by firm 2: 
 
22 2
12 12 2(1 2 ) (2 2 )
18 2 g
cctg cct g hg
Max
−+ + ++ − − − +
− .        (8) 
The equilibrium investment by the domestic government, if it anticipates export by 










.               ( 9 )  
The second order condition for maximisation requires 32 h > , which is assumed to 
hold. 
  Now consider the case where the domestic government anticipates that firm 2 
will undertake FDI. In this situation, the domestic welfare is 
22 2
12 12 2( 2 ) (2 2 )
18 2
f ac cg c c g hg
w
−+ ++ − − +
=− .                          (10) 9 
 
Since (9) is not affected by t, and the difference in domestic welfare under export and 
under FDI by firm 2 is created by t, it is immediate that the equilibrium investment by 










  Although the equilibrium investment by the domestic country is the same 
under export and under FDI by firm 2, i.e., 
* xf ggg = = , it must be noted that the 
domestic welfare under export is different from that of under FDI for a given 
investment by the domestic government. 
 
Proposition 2:  For a given investment by the domestic government on economic 
governance, the domestic welfare is higher under FDI (export) by firm 2 if 
12 2( ) ( ) cc t −> < . 
Proof: Follows immediately from the comparison of (7) and (10). ■  
 
  So far, we have derived the equilibrium investments of the domestic 
government under the assumption that the foreign firm either always exports or it 
always undertakes FDI. Hence, that discussion may not internalise the foreign firm’s 
equilibrium plant location decision, which depends on g, as shown in Proposition 1. 
Now we want to determine the equilibrium investment of the domestic government 
conditional on the equilibrium plant location choice of the domestic government. 
  First consider the relationship between 
* g , which is the welfare maximising 
investment by the domestic government under the assumption that the foreign firm 
either exports always or it undertakes FDI always, and g , which show the critical 
investment by the domestic government on governance that makes the foreign firm 
indifferent between export and FDI. We get that 
* () gg ><  if 10 
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It is immediate that both the inequalities in (11) can hold. For example, ceteris paribus, 
if F is small, left hand side (LHS) of (11) tends to be higher than right hand side (RHS) 
of (11). However, ceteris paribus, if F is relatively high and/or t is small, LHS of (11) 
tends to be lower than RHS of (11). 
  We have seen in Proposition 2 that for a given investment in governance, 
()
f x ww ><  for  12 2( ) ( ) cc t −> < . First, consider the case where  12 2( ) cc t −> , which 
occurs if the marginal cost difference between the firms is sufficiently large compared 
to the transportation cost. This situation may represent the case where a 
technologically superior developed-country firm competes with a very much 
technologically backward developing-country firm. This situation is shown in Figure 
1. 
 
Figure 1: The equilibrium investment by the domestic government for 
f x ww >  and 
* gg <  
 
Figure 1 considers a situation where the parameters are such that  12 2( ) cc t −>  and 
* gg < . These conditions hold if, e.g., t is sufficiently small. In this situation, the 
domestic welfare conditional on the plant location choice of the foreign firm is given 11 
 
by the solid curve ABCDE. This happens because the foreign firm exports up to g  
and it undertakes FDI after g . It follows from Figure 1 that if there is no possibility of 
FDI, the equilibrium investment by the domestic government is 
* g . However, if there 
is a possibility of FDI by the foreign firm, 
* g  amount of investment by the domestic 
government will not attract FDI. The domestic government needs to investment g  to 
induce FDI by the foreign firm. Since the domestic welfare at point D (which gives 
the domestic welfare corresponding to investment g ) is higher than the domestic 
welfare at point B (which gives the maximum domestic welfare under export by the 
foreign firm), the domestic government want to invest in a way that attracts FDI. 
Hence, the equilibrium investment by the domestic government conditional on FDI by 
the foreign firm is g . The possibility of FDI increases the domestic government’s 
investment in governance compared to the situation when FDI is not a possibility. It 
then shows that there is a two-way relationship between governance and FDI, in the 
sense that higher investment in governance attracts FDI, and since there is a 
possibility of FDI, it encourages the domestic government to invest more compared to 
the situation with no possibility of FDI (i.e., when the foreign firm can export only).    
  The reason for the above result is as follows. Better governance reduces the 
marginal costs and induces FDI, which reduces domestic profit but increases 
consumer surplus. However, since the technological superiority of the foreign firm to 
that of the domestic firm is high in relation to the international transportation cost, the 
gain in consumer surplus is more than the loss of domestic profit under FDI 
(compared to export) by the foreign firm, thus encouraging the domestic government 
to attract FDI.  12 
 
Figure 1 considers a situation where F is moderate so that 
* gg >  and point D 
is higher than point B. It follows from (6) and (11) that, ceteris paribus, if F is small 
enough so that 
* gg < , it is easy to understand that the equilibrium investment by the 
domestic government will be 
* g , since this amount of investment will attract FDI and 
will also maximise domestic welfare under FDI. In this situation, while higher 
investment by the government attracts FDI, as shown in Proposition 1, the equilibrium 
investment by the domestic government remains the same whether or not the foreign 
firm has the possibility to undertake FDI. 
  On the other hand, ceteris paribus, if F is sufficiently high so that 
* gg >  and 
the point D is lower than point B, implying that sufficiently large amount of 
investment by the domestic government is required to attract FDI, the equilibrium 
investment of the domestic government will be 
* g , whether or not firm 2 has the 
option for FDI. Here, since the domestic government can attract FDI only by investing 
a large amount in the governance, domestic welfare is higher under export with 
investment 
* g   compared to FDI with investment g . Therefore, even if a large 
investment by the domestic government could attract FDI, so much of investment is 
not worth for the domestic government. Hence, if F is relatively high, the possibility 
of FDI does not affect the domestic government’s investment in economic governance, 
although a large amount of investment by the domestic government could attract FDI. 
  The following proposition summarises the above discussion. 
 
Proposition 3: Consider  12 2( ) cc t −> . 
(i) If the cost of FDI is moderate so that 
* gg >   and “the domestic welfare with 
investment g  and FDI by the foreign firm” is higher than “the domestic welfare with 13 
 
investment 
* g  and export by the foreign firm”, we get a two-way relationship between 
FDI and governance in the sense that higher investment in economic governance 
attracts FDI and the possibility of FDI increases investment in governance compared 
to the situation where FDI is not an option to the foreign firm. 
(ii) Ceteris paribus, if either F is small so that 
* gg <  or F is high so that “
* gg >  
and the domestic welfare with investment g  and FDI by the foreign firm is lower than 
the domestic welfare with investment 
* g   and export by the foreign firm”, the 
possibility of FDI by the foreign firm does not affect the domestic government’s 
investment in governance. 
 
  Now consider the case where  12 2( ) cc t − < . This situation may represent the 
case where a technologically superior developed-country firm competes with a less 




Figure 2: The equilibrium investment by the domestic government for 
f x ww <  and 
* gg >  
 14 
 
Figure 2 considers the case where 
f x ww <  and 
* gg > , which can happen when, e.g., 
F is very small. If FDI is not an option, it is clear that the domestic government 
invests 
* g . However, if FDI is an option to the foreign firm, the foreign firm 
undertakes FDI if domestic investment is 
* g . Since the domestic welfare conditional 
on FDI by the foreign firm is given by the solid curve ABCDE, and the domestic 
welfare at B is higher to that of at D, the equilibrium domestic investment will be g  
so that the foreign firm does not undertake FDI. In contrast to Figure 1, Figure 2 
shows that while better governance attracts FDI, the possibility of FDI reduces the 
domestic government’s investment in governance. Hence, if the marginal cost 
difference between the firms is very close relative to the international transportation 
cost, the possibility of FDI reduces investment in governance compared to the 
situation where FDI is not an option. This happens since better governance induces 
the foreign firm to undertake FDI, which reduces the domestic profit more than the 
gain in consumer surplus, because the technological superiority of the foreign firm to 
that of the domestic firm is not very high. Therefore, in this situation, if we control for 
other benefits from FDI, such as knowledge spillover and domestic employment 
generation, the domestic government prefers relatively poor governance in order to 
prevent FDI. 
  Now consider the case where 
f x ww <  but the fixed cost of FDI is not very 
small so that 
* gg < . Following the above discussions, it must be clear that, in this 
situation, the domestic investment in governance will be 
* g   irrespective of the 
possibility of FDI, and FDI will not occur, since “the domestic welfare with 
investment 
* g  and export by the foreign firm” is higher than “the domestic welfare 
with investment g  and FDI by the foreign firm”. Again, the domestic government 15 
 
does not prefer FDI and therefore, does not increase investment in governance to 
attract FDI. 
  The following proposition summarises the above discussion. 
 
Proposition 4:  Consider  12 2( ) cc t −< . 
(i) If the cost of FDI is small so that 
* gg < , the investment by the domestic 
government in economic governance is g , and FDI does not occur. Here, the 
possibility FDI reduces the investment in governance compared to the situation where 
FDI is not an option to the foreign firm. 
(ii) If F is not very small so that 
* gg > , the possibility of FDI by the foreign firm 
does not affect the domestic government’s investment in governance. 
 
3. Conclusion 
It is a general consensus that better economic governance encourages the firms – from 
micro-enterprises to multinationals – to invest by improving the investment climate. 
While the other branches of economics literature widely discuss the implications of 
economic governance for the development of a country, the literature on international 
trade and FDI did not pay much attention to this aspect. Although there are some 
empirical evidences showing positive correlation between governance and FDI, the 
causality between these two factors is not clear. Moreover, opposite evidence can also 
be found, which suggests a negative relationship between economic governance and 
FDI. 
We show the relationship between economic governance and greenfield FDI 
in a simple model of international oligopoly where a foreign firm can choose between 
export and FDI. We show that higher investment in economic governance increases 16 
 
the possibility of inward FDI. However, where the possibility of FDI increases the 
incentive for investment in economic governance compared to the situation with no 
FDI is not immediate. If the marginal cost difference between the firms is large 
compared to international transportation cost, the possibility of FDI may increase 
investment in governance compared to the situation with no FDI, thus showing that 
there can be a two-way relationship between investment in economic governance and 
inward FDI. However, if the marginal cost difference between the firms is small 
compared to international transportation cost, the possibility of FDI can actually 
reduce investment in governance compared to the situation with no FDI. In this 
situation, if we control for other benefits from FDI, such as knowledge spillover and 
domestic employment generation, the possibility of FDI may encourage a domestic 
government to adopt a system with poor economic governance compared to the 
situation with no FDI. 
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